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Abstract 
Corporate Governance (CG) is complex. It has several 
strands and dimensions and has been much researched. 
Such research confirms that while ―trust‖ is fundamental 
to CG, the legal environment figures prominently within 
it. Within that environment, corporate law provisions 
often place a fiduciary (trusting) duty-obligation on 
directors to act in the best interests of the firm and 
stakeholders. Such provisions tend to be enshrined within 
three recurring principles, Probity, Accountability and 
Transparency, and designed to engender, support and 
encourage trust amongst all concerned. While extant 
country-specific corporate laws-rules-regulations prevail, 
additionally, CG matters are often realised via a 
voluntary (comply or explain) code. To that extent, such 
codes are part of the legal environment. Thus, a key 
objective of the paper is to assess, within the UAE context, 
the extent of any commonality or sharing of the above  
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three principles (primarily Transparency), between that 
country‘s CG laws and Code and those of some other 
major economies. This objective is partly accomplished by 
undertaking a thematic analysis and comparison of major 
international CG Codes with their UAE equivalent, while 
drawing on constructs embedded within Agency and 
Corporate Trust theories. Results indicate that the UAE 
CG statutes and code exhibit a high degree of 
comparability-sharing with relevant major international 
laws-codes. They provide an opportunity to better 
appreciate that while CG is, indeed, country-specific; the 
issues-principles upon which it is grounded are, in a UAE 
context, relatively shared and global. This bodes well for 
freer capital inflows and foreign direct investment. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance (Code), Legal Environment, 
Thematic Analysis, Trust, UAE 
1. Introduction  
―Money makes the world go around‖, sings the popular 1970s film-
musical ―Cabaret‖. And, of course, this claim has some basis and 
foundation. But if money makes the world go round, then it is 
―trust‖ that lubricates its flow and path. For trust is probably the 
critical ingredient behind all successful human relationships. 
Indeed, some argue that without trust we would not be able to 
sustain any form of human relationships. 
In business, the notion of trust is fundamental to contractual 
agreements. It is particularly typified in the case of listed limited 
liability companies, where shareholders (principals) entrust their 
capital to the board of directors (agents) – creating a traditional 
principal-agent relationship - replete with all the issues that emerge 
from that principal-agent tension or conflict. This is the (classic 
agency theory) conflict whereby principals wish their agents to 
maximise their (principal) interests, whereas there is likelihood that 
the agents wish to (at least partially) fulfill  their own self-interest.  
In other words, the economic devolution of ownership to 
professional managers results in the separation of ownership from 
control. While shareholders own the company and provide its 
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capital, the board has control over the economic ability of the firm, 
and hence, are privy to inside information. This is not so for the 
shareholders who own the firm. This gap in terms of information 
ownership and accessibility is often referred to as information 
asymmetry. And the related tension or conflict between owners 
and managers is referred to as the agency conflict. This is the 
conflict that arises when some managers (agents) pursue (only or a 
part of) their own interests at the expense of those of the owners 
(principals). Regardless, principals continue to repose trust in 
agents. And, in particular, shareholders in listed companies 
continue to entrust their capitals into the hands of their boards of 
directors. Why?  
In part, the answer to this lies in features embedded within 
Corporate Governance (CG) and its integral and related principles, 
processes, practices and procedures.  In part, trust continues to be 
placed because of mitigating features set up as a response to these 
agency conflicts. Such features include contractual arrangements 
that closer align the interests of both principal and agent (bonding), 
monitoring activities such as both internal and external audit and 
reporting and legal requirements and obligations imposed on 
directors (primarily via the relevant Company Law). Such features 
are part of CG arrangements and, in part, are often enshrined 
within CG Codes set up within individual countries.1  While such 
Codes are strictly not law or part of the legal environment, much of 
the CG literature regards them as law and so does this paper2. In 
this context we observe that within the corporate world, the notion 
of trust embodies the normative impact of legally delegated 
authority of personal property to a trustee for the mutual benefit of 
                                                          
1For instance, ―The UAE Corporate Governance Code (2009)‖ (formally 
the Ministerial Resolution No. (518) of 2009 Concerning Governance Rules 
and Corporate Discipline Standards, as amended by Ministerial 
Resolution (84) of 2010), ―The U.K. Code on Corporate Governance 
(2012)‖, ―The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004)‖and the 
Third South African ―King Report on Corporate Governance‖ (often 
referred to as King 111 in this paper,). 
 
2 Issues relating to the enforceability of law through a robust, efficient, 
timely and vibrant judiciary are clearly of significant consequence, but for 
purposes of this paper have been consciously not discussed in it. 
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contracting parties. And in modern societies the normative impact 
of societal rules, laws, and legitimacy of conduct, particularly in 
terms of business activity, is reflected in the economic wealth 
generated through the degree of trust that subsists between 
contracting parties (Fukuyama, 1995). However the CG features 
identified and discussed earlier bring with them a cost – agency 
costs. These agency costs are the result of attempts to reduce the 
tension brought about by the divergence of interest between 
managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) (Berle & Means, 
1932; and Jensen &Meckling, 1976). Examples include bonus 
(bonding) costs, internal audit costs and importantly, external audit 
costs.  Against the above background, the purpose of this paper is 
to provide some theoretical insights into some of the legal 
arrangements that enable -or support such CG features both 
generally and with some particular emphasis on the United Arab 
Emirate (UAE) environment. And, subsequent to this introductory 
set of comments, the paper goes on to achieve its purpose via four 
sections.  
In order to facilitate later discussion and evaluation, Section 1 sets 
out some aspects of the background and context to the paper and 
outlines its main objectives while providing a clarification and 
some limited discussion of some key relevant CG terms and 
parlance. This section also reviews some relevant literature in 
relation to trust, corporate governance, features inherent within 
corporate governance (such as probity, accountability and 
transparency) and then discusses how some of these issues link in 
with others within the overall fabric of governance.  
Section 2 provides an exposition of the methodology employed to 
achieve the objectives of the paper. It also presents a limited 
explanation of the analytical technique used for that achievement – 
i.e. thematic analysis.  
Section 3 undertakes the execution and accomplishment of the 
objectives of the paper and presents the results of that exercise.  
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2. Research background, context, key terms and objectives 
In part, this section explains and discusses terms critical to an 
appreciation of it. Such terms include trust, probity, accountability, 
transparency and, of course, CG itself. 
Research background and context  
The context of the paper is essentially twofold. The first is CG 
generally and, more particularly, the individual CG Codes of the 
four selected environments – i.e. the United Kingdom, South 
Africa, the OECD and the UAE. The second relates to the precise 
macro- and micro- economic aspects of the selected environments 
themselves. While not much need be stated in relation to three of 
the four contexts, it would be appropriate to state somewhat more 
about the fourth – i.e. the UAE. Accordingly, some of the 
paragraphs that follow serve to precisely fulfill that function. 
Considering the first of these two features, one observes that CG is 
the manner in which boards ―control and direct‖ the activities of 
the companies of which they are directors (Cadbury Committee, 
1992). 
However, more important than what it is about, are the principles 
upon which CG should be developed. And, in terms of principles, 
the following words of the Cadbury Committee (1992, Section 3) 
are most informative.  
―The principles on which the Cadbury Code is 
based are those of openness, integrity and 
accountability. They go together. Openness on the 
part of companies, within the limits set by their 
competitive position, is the basis for the confidence 
which needs to exist between business and all those 
who have a stake in its success. An open approach 
to the disclosure of information contributes to the 
efficient working of the market economy, prompts 
boards to take effective action and allows 
shareholders and others to scrutinise companies 
more thoroughly. Integrity means both 
straightforward dealing and completeness. What is 
required of financial reporting is that it should be 
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honest and that it should present a balanced 
picture of the state of the company‘s affairs. The 
integrity of reports depends on the integrity of 
those who prepare and present them. Boards of 
directors are accountable to their shareholders and 
both have to play their part in making that 
accountability effective. Boards of directors need to 
do so through the quality of the information which 
they provide to shareholders and shareholders 
through their willingness to exercise their 
responsibilities as owners‖.  
Arguments for adhering to the Code tend to be of a twofold nature: 
First, a clear understanding of ―responsibilities‖ and an open 
approach to the way in which they have been discharged will assist 
boards of directors in framing and winning support for their 
strategies. It will also assist the efficient operation of capital 
markets and increase confidence in boards, auditors and financial 
reporting and hence the general level of confidence in business. 
Second, if standards of financial reporting and of business conduct 
more generally are not seen to be raised, a greater reliance on 
regulation may be inevitable. Any further degree of regulation 
would, in any event, be more likely to be well directed, if it were to 
enforce what has already been shown to be workable and effective 
by those setting the standard.  
While Cadbury refers to Integrity, Accountability and Openness, 
this paper suggests that the terms Probity, Accountability and 
Transparency are marginally more helpful in conveying fuller 
insights into the nature of CG. Thus, for this paper, these terms are 
employed and used as the basis for examination. Taking each of 
these in turn, one observes that the term Probity certainly embraces 
the concept of acting with Integrity. But, it is more than that. 
Together with several other features, significantly ethicality, it also 
includes acting with full propitiousness and honesty. And for that 
reason the term Probity is employed in this paper. Further, the 
paper argues that Probity is supported by enabling and ensuring 
that members of the Board of Directors are fairly remunerated – i.e. 
sound and equitable remuneration systems and applications. This 
is consistent with the bonding inferences contained within classic 
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Agency Theory explications. It leads to the argument that 
wholesome director remuneration procedures and practices are 
crucial for directors to conduct their corporate affairs and discharge 
their responsibilities with probity. Equally, because probity is so 
embracive and encompassing we observe it includes and subsumes 
the other two principles of accountability and transparency.  
Consistent with Cadbury Committee (1992), this paper uses the 
term accountability; though instead of the term Openness this 
paper uses one of its synonyms - transparency. Finally, this paper 
suggests that Accountability is supported and encouraged through 
sound Leadership while Transparency is supported by sound 
measures of Internal Control. The argument is that all that 
encourages good Leadership encourages and enhances 
accountability and all that encourages the establishment and 
practice of sound Internal Control also encourages and supports 
Transparency. Such thinking has influenced some of the 
methodological approach used within the paper. Corporate 
Governance provisions have been codified within many 
jurisdictions, such as the OECD Code (2004), the South Africa King 
III (2009) Code and the UK Code on Corporate Governance (2010). 
In all likelihood, these Codes provide a basis for, and a major 
paradigm shift towards, convergence of core provisions - 
anticipating similar corporate governance mechanisms and 
exhibiting comparable internal structures of monitoring and 
control. The background to this paper is the issue of Corporate 
Governance. And the precise contexts or reference points within 
which the paper is presented are the CG approaches-thinking as 
contained in the following four CG Codes:   
1. OECD Code, 2004 
2. South Africa - Kings III Report Code, 2009 
3. UAE Corporate Governance Code, 2009 
4. UK Code on Corporate Governance, 2012 
 
Considering the above Codes, one must observe that they all do not 
have the same degree of application, enforcement and monitoring. 
For instance, the UK CG Code 2012 is operated on a ―comply or 
explain‖ basis. That is corporates may choose to apply particular 
provisions of the Code and not others. But when provisions are not 
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applied, there is an obligation to explain why and how. This is 
referred to as the ―comply or explain‖ obligation of that Code. 
Other CG Codes are required to be applied on a compulsory basis 
with no provision for particular opt outs. Still other Codes are 
provided in the form of Guiding Principles only with the intention 
that corporates give expression to both the spirit and the letter of 
these principles. This is true of the OECD‘s 2004 Principles of 
Corporate Guidance. Additionally, because of its relative 
uniqueness, aspects of the precise prevailing context of CG within 
the UAE are aired in the part of the paper. 
The UAE environment – selected economic and legal highlights 
With a population of circa 5 million (2012 CIA World facts), of 
which 20% is native to that country, the UAE has the world‘s 7th 
highest annual per capita GDP at circa $48,000 (2012-CIA World 
facts). In absolute terms, it has 30th highest GDP in the world. It is 
an emerging economy with a 2012 GDP of $360 billion. In the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG), in 
GDP terms, it ranks second, after Saudi Arabia. Within the Middle 
East-North Africa (MENA) region, it ranks third (after Saudi 
Arabia and Iran). The preceding statistics provide an impetus and 
motivation to contribute to the body of knowledge in relation to 
CG in the UAE. In part, this is because despite its differences, it 
exhibits an evolving Corporate Law and CG environment 
somewhat similar to those in the major economies buried within a 
set of dynamics, specific to the UAE. These include its cultural 
background, Islamic heritage and an evolving and vibrant 
economic demography. In this context, two particular themes are 
relevant:  the legal environment and the UAE Companies Law. The 
legal requirements of listed firms were first issued in 1984 (UAE 
Commercial Companies Law No. 8, 1984). Some of these placed 
fiduciary duties on directors, similar to those contained in the UK 
Companies Act (2006). Previously, the UAE Companies Law (1984) 
reflected a somewhat limited set of legal provisions. But, with 
increasing economic activity and intense global interaction with 
UAE firms, the provisions were appropriately updated in 2010. 
This was also the result of an exponential increase in FDIs and 
increased demand by foreign investors for greater protection 
(Cornelius & Kogut, 2003); the UAE Companies Law was updated 
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in 2010. The intention was to provide foreign investors with 
efficient legal recourse and unimpeded access to UAE capital 
markets. So, with a few exceptions (military contracts and air 
travel) reserved for Emiratis and the State, ―majority-ownership‖ 
rights in many industry sectors are now enabled. 
Key research terms 
Consideration of any issue requires an appreciation of its key 
concepts and terms integral to it and upon which it is predicated. In 
the present context of CG and some Codes linked with it, the 
following concepts and terms are of consequence. Hence a brief re-
consideration of them is in order. And, as some emphasis is placed 
on the issue of transparency, this is considered in some more detail. 
These key terms and issues are trust, probity, accountability, 
transparency, CG and its nature and impact. 
Trust in its conceptual form is integral to this paper. If one were to 
assume the Utopian possibility of total trust being present at all 
times, in all situations and shared by all persons, then any 
arrangements designed to minimise, ensure or encourage the 
placing of trust would be redundant. In other words, arrangements 
such as those encompassed within CG would be superfluous and 
redundant.  
Probity is described as the quality of possessing strong moral 
principles and expressing them through the exercise of honesty and 
decency. In the corporate world, this would imply that all relevant 
information, both financial and non-financial, is available to users 
so that they may make informed economic decisions and that 
economic welfare for all stakeholders is given due regard and be 
made available for and open to public scrutiny (OECD, 2002). Some 
limited reflection on the issue suggests that the issues of 
accountability and transparency are subsumed within the concept 
of probity. 
Accountability refers to the obligation or willingness to appropriately 
accept responsibility, or to account, for one's actions. It also refers to the 
quality or state of being accountable. In the present context, it refers to 
the responsibility of the board for the economic-sustainable welfare 
of the firm, with it (the board) being ultimately accountable for its 
actions in relation to the firm. 
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Transparency, in its simplest sense, means clear, unhindered 
honesty in the way that one does business. In the corporate world, 
the board has stewardship over the assets of the firm and in 
fulfillment of that stewardship, will put in place mechanisms of 
internal control so as to safeguard investors‘ interests and provide 
long-term economic sustainability to the firm. Such internal control 
features help bring about transparency which may also be seen as a 
―lack of hidden agendas or conditions, accompanied by the 
availability of full information required for collaboration, 
cooperation, and collective decision making.  It is an essential 
condition for a free and open exchange whereby the rules and 
reasons behind regulatory measures are fair and clear to all 
participants.‖ 
In other words, transparency is more than mere honesty. Being 
transparent also depends on the form, disclosure, degree, 
factuality, and timeliness of that honesty. For example, if a 
company engages in a practice that costs its members or 
shareholders money, but doesn‘t admit its responsibility for the 
loss until years later, that is not transparent behaviour, regardless 
of how completely the company discloses it. The separation of 
ownership from control presents managers with the opportunity to 
expropriate or maximise their own utility at the expense of the 
owners is implicit within Agency Theory (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this context, both internally adopted 
and externally imposed mechanisms of corporate governance, 
collectively, provide a degree of transparency that may well 
decrease agency costs and create positive wealth effects for owners. 
Further, regulatory imposition on firms to behave and externally 
disclose information to and constrain managerial behaviour, so 
orchestrating a level of transparency in financial reporting that 
facilitates the efficacy and utility to users of financial information 
(Mallin, 2012).  
Taking regard for the preceding discussion, one could capture its 
essence within the following Figure 1. 
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Fig 1: Interlinkage  of Corporate Governance Themes and Related Support 
Constructs 
 
Figure 1 captures the interlinkage between the three themes of 
Probity, Accountability and Transparency. It suggests that 
Accountability and Responsbility are essential ingredients of 
Probity, all of which are enabled via three specific constructs, 
namely, Remuneration (the contractual obligation between 
contracting parties i.e. owners and managers), Leadership 
(enabling vision and stratgey) and Internal Control (monitoring 
and control of the the firms assets). 
Corporate Governance – nature and impact  
CG is often described as the set of principles and processes that 
govern the way a company is ―directed and controlled‖. 
Fundamentally, it is about such questions as what business is for—
and in whose interests companies should be run, and how. Wider 
issues such as business ethics via entire value chains, human rights, 
bribery and corruption, and climate change are among the great 
issues of our time that increasingly cross-cut the corporate 
boardrooms. As a result, inevitably there is a fusion between 
corporate governance and wider societal concerns.  
The OECD (1999), states: ―Increasingly, the OECD and its member 
governments have recognised the synergy between macroeconomic 
and structural policies. One key element in improving economic 
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efficiency is corporate governance, which involves a set of 
relationships between a company‘s management, its board, its 
shareholders, and other stakeholders.‖ Thus, CG calls for directors 
and executives in companies to exercise probity, transparency, and 
accountability so as to create sound governance in the firm at all 
levels. These concepts are implicitly discussed in ―Corporate 
Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance – Two Models of the 
Corporation‖ (Eisenberg, 1983). In his deliberation, Eisenberg 
addresses five fundamental questions: 
1. What is the fundamental institutional nature of the 
corporation within society? 
2. How is the power of the corporation legitimated? 
3. What should be the objective and the manner of conduct of 
the corporation? 
4. What should be the role of management in the corporation? 
5. What should be the role and composition of a corporation's 
board of directors? 
Research relevant theories 
This paper is a theoretical one. It evaluates the research data in a 
particular fashion and engages with two important theories: 
Agency Theory and Theory of Corporate Trust. 
Agency Theory 
Much has been written and opined in terms of this theory. Its 
literature is historic, vast and varied. It encompasses some as old as 
that of Adam Smith (1776) to Berle & Means (1932) to Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) and Watts & Zimmerman (1986). Thus, not much 
need be re-stated at this juncture, especially as the aspects of the 
theory relevant to this paper have already been stated on the first 
page of this paper.  
Theory of Corporate Trust 
To a large extent, the Theory of Corporate Trust is an exploratory 
one that enables the conceptualisation and manifestation of trust. 
The theory also facilitates an explanation of the constituents of trust 
in enabling a desired managerial behaviour (Fukuyama, 1995). 
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Indeed, from a corporate perspective, the role of trust is 
encapsulated in Corporate Governance.  
Part of the role of CG is to manage agency issues by aligning the 
interests of owners with that of management (Maher & Anderson, 
1999). Corporate Governance, therefore, is set mechanisms by 
which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury Committee, 
1992). This suggests that corporate governance mechanisms must 
contribute to the efficient running of a business in such a way that 
reduces managerial propensity to engage in purposeful 
intervention in reported earnings that may have an economic 
impact on the firm value (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). As detailed 
below, CG is one mechanism for operationalizing trust in a multi-
stakeholder environment. The Theory of Corporate Trust provides 
the propositional underpinning by which the three major Codes are 
evaluated and their influence on the UAE CG Code development. 
The latter enables the evaluation of the impact of externally-
imposed influences on UAE regulators and compliance quality of 
UAE firms.  
Theory of Corporate Trust - UAE perspective 
Kuran (2005) suggests that the modern corporation is not 
recognised in the Islamic tradition since Islamic jurisprudence only 
recognises a natural person while the concept of ―Limited Liability‖ 
recognises a corporation as a ―legal person‖. However, since 
corporations are run by natural persons, the idea of limited-liability 
has found grounds in the Islamic world and corporations exist 
subject to similar legal and statutory implications and fiduciary 
duties as those in the West. However, the ―corporation‖ is a 
relatively new concept in the UAE. Corporate Governance is one 
mechanism in operationalizing trust in a stakeholder environment. 
However, the efficacy of Corporate Governance Codes is evaluated 
in this paper from an international perspective and hence the 
impact of that perspective on UAE CG Code. 
3. Research objectives 
The paper has two main objectives: 
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1. The first objective is to identify the presence (absence) and 
comparable sharing of particular themes critical within CG 
Codes (i.e. probity, accountability and transparency) in the 
four previously identified themes.   
2. The second objective is to consider and evaluate the same 
four Codes in terms of the two previously identified 
theories – i.e. Agency Theory and the Theory of Corporate 
Trust – particularly in the context of the UAE. 
4. Research Methodology, Design and Approach 
In this section an analysis-examination of identified constructs of 
CG in terms of the two referenced theories – i.e. the Theory of 
Corporate Trust and Agency Theory– and the contents of the four 
identified CG Codes is undertaken. The analysis is undertaken 
through a process of ‗thematic analyses. This analysis enables the 
revelation and confirmation (or otherwise) of the thematic 
recurrence of the identified themes within the four Codes. Thus, 
drawing much on some relevant literature, this section provides: 
1. A brief exposition of thematic analysis and then employing 
a limited form of this analysis, show how each of the 
immediately preceding terms have been considered within 
the relevant literature. 
2. A considered argument appropriately referenced into the 
(professional and academic research) literature as to how 
the four referenced CG Codes reflect one or more of the 
three identified CG themes.  
Thematic Analysis 
This part of the current section is devoted to an explanation of 
Thematic Analysis (TA), the analytical technique used to analyse 
the data relevant to this paper. TA is a method of researching and 
analysing qualitative data. In essence, the method requires the 
researcher to identify a limited number of themes (or recurring 
patterns) that may lie submerged within data provided by, or 
originating from, a range of meaningfully comparable sources. TA 
is often used as a relatively simple method of qualitative data 
analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) see it as a foundational method 
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of analysis and suggest its simplicity recommends itself for initial 
research and newer researchers. While some methods of analysis 
are tied in with particular theories, thematic analysis is relatively 
free-standing and may be applied within the context of most (if not 
all) theories. Appropriate usage of thematic analysis enables a rich 
and detailed description of all the relevant data while still 
addressing any complexity that may be contained within it. For this 
reason Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) define thematic analysis as ―a 
method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within 
data‖. More helpfully, they (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 79) explain a 
(pattern or) theme as capturing ―something important about the 
data in relation to the research (question) and represents some level 
of patterned response or meaning within the data set.‖  The 
identification of themes within the relevant data being researched 
enables a measure of organization to be reflected across it but 
equally it allows a level of description to be applied to it.  And, in 
some cases, the analysis may well suggest impossible 
interpretations to aspects of the research data. In some instances, 
the identification of patterned themes may be assisted through the 
use of numeric codes and (possibly) sub-codes. However, in all 
cases, the intention would be to ―tease out‖ common patterns 
(themes) that lie submerged within individual experiences, 
accounts, statements or pronouncements. The analysis may be 
conducted at superficial level or at a more intensive in-depth level. 
The former requires identification only of recurring themes that are 
very obviously observed, while the latter requires a more 
considered and inquiring analysis to reveal also themes that are not 
observable at the superficial level. This paper employs limited 
―thematic analysis‖ in accomplishing the first of its two objectives 
and so it would be appropriate to consider thematic analysis at an 
initial superficial level only. Thus, Thematic Analysis is used to 
search and evaluate for the three relevant themes of Probity, 
Accountability and Transparency. Not unexpectedly, these three 
themes do appear with some significant recurrence within all the 
four CG Codes evaluated. Concurrently, the theory of Corporate 
Trust provides the basis for conceptual review of how the notion of 
Trust is operationalized within a corporate perspective through the 
lens of specific Corporate Governance Codes. 
 
Ushus J B Mgt 13, 3 (2014)                                                          ISSN 0975-3311 
 
16 
 
Research Data 
To achieve the paper‘s objectives, the precise text within three 
major CG Codes and one not fully globally-appreciated Corporate 
Governance Code are evaluated against potential thematic bases. 
The three major Corporate Governance Codes are those of the UK, 
OECD and South Africa, They provide the basis for thematic 
evaluation and comparability with that of the last CG Code – i.e. 
that of the UAE. Thus data for the review of CG codes is derived 
from the following published CG Codes: 
1. UK Code on Corporate Governance, 2012 
2. South Africa - Kings III Report Code, 2009  
3. UAE Corporate Governance Code, 2009 
4. OECD Code, 2004  
Research Analysis 
Employing Thematic Analysis, a selected review of important 
themes and code development is conducted identifying 
developments that have taken place in major jurisdictions/global 
organisations such as the UK and the OECD. These developments 
are compared with CG Code development within the UAE. As 
such, the main research question investigated is: What are the 
similarities of major provisions of Corporate Governance codes in 
the global context that relate to the concepts of Probity, 
Accountability and Transparency? And, in reviewing these CG 
Codes, the three previously identified conceptual constructs of 
Probity, Accountability and Transparency are employed. Good 
support for such an approach is provided by La Porta et al 2002; 
Larcker & Tayab, 2008 and IFRS, 2010. 
5.  Research Findings and Related Discussion 
This section of the paper is limited to a very brief revelation and 
discussion of its main findings. Regrettably, space constraints do 
not permit a fuller explanation and interpretation of the paper‘s 
findings. However, a visual depiction of them is presented in 
Tables 1 and 11 (Pages 17 and 18) of this section – one that also 
provides some limited discussion of the identified themes and their 
related support constructs.   
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Relationship between conceptual themes and Corporate 
Governance Codes 
Thematic Analysis of conceptual themes and the transpiring 
relationships that have been discussed under Probity, 
Accountability and Responsibility in the preceding sections 
describe the need for corporate governance codes.  
Four major codes analysed for similarity within identified CG 
themes are presented in TABLE 1 (Page 17). While the list is not 
exhaustive, the principal themes representing Probity, 
Accountability and Transparency are individually evaluated – each 
on the basis of its main supporting construct i.e. Remuneration, 
Leadership and Internal Control respectively. Emerging from the 
three themes identified earlier, namely, Probity, Accountability and 
Transparency, three interrelated major themes are identified that 
have a relevant bearing, namely, Leadership, Remuneration and 
Internal Control. The themes are investigated and comparison 
made with the provisions of the UAE Corporate Governance Code 
(2010) and the major European and South Africa codes identified 
above.  
The relationship between the above themes and constructs are 
diagrammatically represented in FIGURE 1 (Page 10), 
demonstrating the inter-linkage that transpires and how these are 
codified within the various corporate governance provisions. And, 
these are tabulated within TABLE 1(Page 17) following: 
The three key themes of Corporate Governance, Probity, 
Accountability and Responsibility, have their roots in Agency 
theory. Theories of corporate governance suggest that major CG 
codes should exhibit core structural provisions. This would suggest 
that in both emerging capital markets (such as the UAE) and 
developed capital markets, provisions of CG codes should 
generally provide evidence of core structures that are much the 
same or, at least, very similar. The findings revealed in Table 11 
(Page 18) confirm this to be very much the case. 
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Relationship between “Probity and Remuneration” 
Figure 1 suggests that much of the contractual relationship 
(between managers and owners) is manifest through Remuneration 
designed to facilitate managerial behaviour that will bring about 
maximisation of shareholder wealth and stakeholder interests 
(Becht et al, 2005; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; and Peng & Roell, 
2008). The CG Codes examined provide evidence of transparency 
via responsible disclosure of management-director remuneration. 
Indeed, Agency Theory would argue that under optimal 
contractual settings managers will work in the best interests of the 
owners and various stakeholders (Pornsit et al, 2010). The level of 
transparency will be a function of the quantity and quality of 
director remuneration disclosure (Khan, 2009; Ali & Hwang, 2000). 
Such thinking is supported by prior research on the inter-
relationship between ―Remuneration‖, firm performance and firm 
value (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986; Bhagat & Bolton, 2011). 
Not surprisingly therefore, the Thematic Analysis of the CG Codes 
undertaken (TABLE 11), reveals broadly similar provisions related 
to director remunerations. The provisions on remuneration indicate 
that it is the responsibility for an independent ―Remuneration 
Committee‖ to decide on director remuneration as a mechanism of 
monitoring, control and transparency. 
Table 1: Tabular Presentation Themes Embedded Within Corporate 
Governance and Their Related Support Constructs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Probity  Accountability  Transparency  
Supported by fair 
Remuneration 
manifest via 
Supported by sound 
Leadership 
manifest via 
Supported by strong 
Internal Control 
manifest via 
Definition of 
responsible officers 
Remuneration and 
Firm Performance 
Responsibilities 
Responsibilities 
Chair 
Remuneration and 
Firm Value 
Purpose, tasks and 
powers 
Corporate 
governing body 
Board Performance 
Reporting to 
shareholder 
Duality Director Performance 
Performance and 
Evaluation of Board  
Board Size Value Creation 
Delegation of 
authority 
Board Balance (ED's 
and NED's) 
Remuneration 
Committee Size 
Audit Committee 
Size 
Board Meetings 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Independence 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
Formalities: BoD Remuneration Audit Committee 
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Table 2: Corporate Governance Themes and Related Manifestations 
Relationship between “Accountability and Leadership” 
The relationship between Accountability and Responsibility is 
facilitated through Leadership (Figure 1, above). The role of the 
board of a corporate body is to provide vision and strategy for 
business growth and sustainability. Further, boards have the 
responsibility to provide oversight by ensuring that a collective 
measure of RISK is appropriate to business risk-appetite (Radner, 
2002). The board also has responsibility for compliance with 
regulatory and statutory provisions as well as corporate 
governance principles and their disclosure requirements 
(Abdelsalam et al, 2007). The appropriateness of Remuneration 
policy and Leadership will enable firms to discharge their duties in 
a faithfully accountable (and transparent) manner ensuring 
relevant levels of disclosure (The European Commission Action 
Plan on Company Law and Corporate Governance [12 Dec 2012]). 
Not surprisingly therefore, again, the Thematic Analysis of the four 
CG Codes undertaken (TABLE 11), reveals a high consistency of 
Probity  Accountability  Transparency  
Supported by fair 
Remuneration 
manifest via 
Supported by sound 
Leadership 
manifest via 
Supported by strong 
Internal Control 
manifest via 
Board Size Value Creation 
Delegation of 
authority 
Board Balance (ED's 
and NED's) 
Remuneration Committee 
Size 
Audit Committee Size 
Board Meetings 
Remuneration Committee 
Independence 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
Formalities: BoD 
Meetings 
Remuneration Committee 
Chairman 
Audit Committee 
Chairman 
Corporate 
Governance 
responsibilities 
Remuneration Committee 
expertise 
Audit Committee 
expertise 
Directors' induction Directors‘ Remuneration  Risk assessment 
Info. for directors 
for decision-making 
Shareholders rights 
 
Director training  
Evaluation of Board 
Performance 
 
 
Ushus J B Mgt 13, 3 (2014)                                                          ISSN 0975-3311 
 
20 
 
similar provisions (detailed within that Table) related to 
Leadership. 
Relationship between “Transparency and Internal Control” 
It is the responsibility of the corporate board to facilitate and enable 
mechanisms of internal control. Such controls help safeguard the 
assets and interests of all stakeholders. Indeed, mechanisms of 
internal control provide the basis for safeguarding the firm‘s assets 
and positively control the firm‘s exposure to various types of 
financial and non-financial risk. Firms with a robust set of internal 
control systems, monitored by an equally robust internal audit 
function that detects and reports material weaknesses in 
organisational mechanisms depict higher levels of transparency 
(Chadwick, 2000). CG Codes and relevant statutes place a fiduciary 
duty and responsibility for safeguarding the assets and resources of 
a firm on its directors. Accordingly, CG Codes facilitate effective 
monitoring and control system so as to enable boards to take 
responsibility for their actions, while providing incentive 
alignments toward corporate goals and objectives. Therefore, 
optimal contractual relationship between stakeholders (primarily 
shareholders) and directors tend to facilitate probity and 
transparency exercised in conjunction with effective leadership 
which itself is supported by strong internal control mechanisms. 
Not surprisingly therefore, again, the Thematic Analysis of the four 
CG Codes undertaken (TABLE 11), reveals a high consistency of 
similar provisions (detailed within that Table) related to 
Leadership. 
Corporate Governance and the UAECG Code 
Having determined the key themes structured within CG and the 
forms in which each of these are manifest (TABLE 1) within the 
four CG Codes of interest (TABLE 11), it is of further interest and in 
fulfillment of Objective 2, to comment on how these features are 
shared or commonly expressed within the relevant UAE CG Code. 
Space constraints do not permit a detailed discussion of these 
issues, but a simple listing of the same follows: 
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 The UAE CG Code (CGC) contains highly comparable 
provisions with regard to Probity-Accountability-
Transparency. For instance, as is the case for the three other 
CG Codes considered in this paper, Article 1 of the UAE 
CGC specifically identifies the relevant officers who bear 
legal responsibility and their rights of office. This suggests 
that Article 1 goes some way to mitigate the ―duality‖ 
issues, thus enhancing leadership quality. 
 Equally, Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the UAE CG Code identify the 
fiduciary duties on the Board of Directors (BoD) – these 
being very similar to the three major Codes considered in 
this paper. Thus, again, with regard to the fiduciary and 
legal impositions, the UAE CG Code appears to be 
structured according to international standards of 
Corporate Governance.  
 One distinction, however, between the three major CG 
Codes considered in this paper and the UAE CG Code is the 
fact that the latter exhibits the ―comply” dynamic rather 
than the ―comply-or-explain‖ exhortation.  
 While several provisions in the UAE CG Code attempt to 
mirror or reflect the three other major CG codes, others are 
relatively singular. For instance, somewhat uniquely, the 
UAE CG Code (Article 118) re-iterates the Commercial 
Companies Law requiring Director‘s Remuneration to be no 
greater than 10% of net profits after disbursements. Thus, in 
remuneration terms, board members are limited to an upper 
ceiling of 10% of net profits. Consequently, it follows that 
no Director‘s Remuneration may be paid in a loss-making 
year.  
 Further, while directors are nominated by majority 
shareholders, their utility to persuade to act in a particular 
manner via levels of director remuneration appears to be 
restricted.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has been about Corporate Governance. More 
specifically, it has been about particular legal implications relating 
to CG. And, even more specifically, it has been about the legal 
implications relating to CG, as contained within the CG Codes and- 
Principles of four individual jurisdictions. Further, the paper has 
compared and evaluated the UAE CG Code with those of three 
major CG Codes. Overall, it has determined a high degree of 
comparability and similarity between these three CG Codes and 
that of the UAE CG Code. While recognising that the effectiveness 
of any Code or legislation is inherently linked in with an effective, 
timely and unimpaired judiciary, consistent with Cornelius & 
Kogut (2003), the paper suggests that one positive outcome of its 
determination, will likely be an enhanced willingness and 
favourable disposition toward the advancement of healthy positive 
Foreign Direct Investments in the UAE. On that basis, this bodes 
well for the economy of the UAE. 
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